Conflict of Laws: Final Examination (May 15, 1973) by William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Exams: 1944-1973 Faculty and Deans
1973
Conflict of Laws: Final Examination (May 15,
1973)
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1973 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/exams
Repository Citation
William & Mary Law School, "Conflict of Laws: Final Examination (May 15, 1973)" (1973). Faculty Exams: 1944-1973. Paper 364.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/exams/364
CONFLICT OF LA'Y']S 
A. J. Santoro Final Examination May 15, 1973 
Please read the entire examination Hith care before starting to \vrite. 
Please ~.;r :i-ite legibly and on one side of the paper. If you feel that an 
essential element of fact is not stated, make and expressly state an 
appropriate assumption and anSvler the question both with and without 
the assumption. Discuss all issues fairly raised \vhether or not 
dispos itive of the case. 
1. 5 Points (9 l1inutes) 
On November 10, 1970, John, a lifelong resident of liassachusetts, married 
l1ary, a life long resident of Rhode Island. Immediately after the marriage, 
the couple Hent to live in John's summer cottage on Cape Cod Hhile t-laiting 
for the completion of a permanent residence in Boston. Before the house was 
completed, ho\V'ever, John was drafted into the Army and Hary '-lent to live with 
her ~V'idotV'ed mother in Cranston, Rhode Island. 
Sometime during June, 1971, Nary was advised by her physician to move to 
a warmer climate for her health. She communicated this to John, who wrote 
ins i sting that Hary move to Hiami Hhere they could make their home after his 
discharge. Accordingly, Nary and her mother moved to Hiami on August 10, 1971 
and took up residence in a condominium mmed by Hary's mother. Hary also 
arranged for the sale of the nou completed Boston house. 
On April 28, 1973, John ~as mustered out of the service at Fort Dix, 
New Jersey and promptly started for Florida. He arrived at his mother-in 
law's residence on May 1, 1973, and there remained until he purchased a home 
in Fort Lauderdale some three '-1eeks later. 
The Florida legislature had recently passed a statute providing for a 
$1,000 bonus to Viet Nam veterans (as John was) Hho \V'ere domiciled in Florida 
on or before January 1, 1973. The bonus was an attempt by the state 
legislature to provide compensation for the disruption to families caused 
by the 'var. 
John seeks your advice as to Hhether or not he is entitled to the bonus. 
II. 5 Points (9 minutes) 
Vitali, a national of Italy, came to the United States in 1969 on a 
temporary visitors visa which t-1as valid for six months plus extensions. 
At various intervals after his arrival in the U. S. he applied for and 
received extensions. The condition for obtaining the extensions \V'as that 
he Sign a statement reciting his foreign residence as Rome, that he was 
admitted for a temporary period and that he was in possession of a return 
ticket to Italy. 
During his stay in the United States, Vi tali commenced operations as 
a treaty trader, married and purchased a home in Perth Amboy, Nev7 Jersey. 
He frequently applied for, but was denied, a permanent visa. 
A treaty trader is defined as : "An alien entitled to enter the United 
States under and in pursua~ce of the provisions of a treaty of commerce and 
navigation be~veen the United States and the foreign state of which he is a 
national solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in 
which he has invested. 11 
There is, hotvever, no such treaty beaveen Italy and the United States. 
Vitali held himself out as a treaty trader because of a gratuitous notation 
on his temporary visa \-Jhich reads as fo11oy1S: "Hr. Vitali would be eligible 
for a permanent visa if the appropriate treaty bea.;reen the United States and 
Italy ~'lere in effect. lsi John A. Marino American Vice-Consul." 
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Vitali has continued his stay in the U. S. for some four years pursuing 
his trading operations. 
In 1972 he sought a divorce from his \V'ife and although he could prove 
sufficient grounds for divorce, the court dismissed the proceedings because 
of lack of jurisdiction. Vitali wa..'1ts you to advise him as to whether or not 
an appeal would be desirable. 
III. 20 Points (36 Hinutes) 
Sam and Laura ,,,ere married in 1950 and lived in the state of Net.;r York 
from 1950 until 1962 . Sam has been employed by the Federal Immigration Service 
since 1949. In 1962, he was transferred to Boston . Hassachusetts and lived 
there until 1966 when he lIas transferred to Baltimore, Haryland. At govern-
ment expense, he , his ~;life and children moved to Baltimore , Naryland, where 
they lived from 1966 to 1970 . 
In 1970, Laura and the children went to New York, at the insistence of 
Sam, so that the children could visit ''lith Sam's dying mother and so Laura 
could be of some comfort during the mother ' s last days. Sam paid the fare 
and continuously sent money to Laura for herfs and the children's support. 
Some months later his mother died and he went to New York for the funeral. 
At that time, Sam informed Laura that they ";.;rere evicted from their residence 
in Baltimore, that he had no suitable replacement and that he would send for 
them when he found housing. 
Unable to find housing, Laura and the children remained in New York and 
Sam sold some of their Baltimore furniture. The balance of the furniture tvas 
sent to New York and placed in storage . 
At about the same time, Sam t,Yas temporarily transferred to Atlanta, 
Georgia, and because of this , suggested that Laura and the children continue 
to remain in Nevi York. Prior to his trip to Atlanta, Sam had purchased a 
trailer and stationed it at a trailer camp in Baltimore, but shortly before 
his Atlanta trip he took the trailer to Alexandria, Virginia, parked it in 
a parking lot and commuted to Baltimore from Alexandria. 
On May 20, 1971, Sam obtained a divorce in Alexandria based on his 
Virginia domicile and on June 30 s 1971 he married , at Potomac, Haryland, his 
present wife whom he had met and became enamored of ~vhile his family \-I'as 
residing in Ne1V' York. 
At this point, Laura becomes suspicious of his insistence that she stay 
in New York and she and the children ll.'1expectedly returned to Naryland in 
August 1971. After a fe\.;r days Sam told Laura of his divorce in Virginia. 
Laura returned to Nell York 1;vhere she ins tituted divorce proceedings. Pursuant 
to statute, Sam tV'as served in Naryland. The statute provided that where the 
complaint demands judgment in divorce, service may be made outside the state 
on a defendant domiciled in New York. This service has been held by New York 
to give the court personal jurisdiction over the party served. 
The New York court granted Laura 
set aside the divorce decree in favor 
Laura alimony of $1,200.00 per year. 
alimony was awarded reads as follovs: 
a divorce on the grounds of adultery~ 
of Sam of the Virginia court, and awarded 
The N. Y. statute under which the 
IlvJhere the husband in an action for divorce, separation, annulment, 
or declaration of nullity of a void marriage, or a person other than the 
husband when an action for an annulment is maintained after the death of 
the husband, makes default in paying any sum of money as required by 
the judgment or order directing the payment thereof, the court in its 
discretion may make an order directing the entry of judgment for the 
amount of such arrears, or for such part thereof as justice requires , 
having a regard to the circumstances of the respective parties, together 
,,11th ten dollars costs and disbursements. The application for such order 
shall be upon such notice to the husband or other person as the court 
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may direct •. Such judgment may be enforced by execution or in any other 
manner prov1ded by law for the collection of money judgments. The relief 
herein provided for is in addition to any and every other remedy to v1hich 
the wife may be entitled under the law; provided that ,",'hen a judgment 
for such arrears or any part thereof shall have been entered pursuant to 
this section , such judgment shall thereafter not be subject to modification 
under the discretionary pm'ler granted by this section ; and after the entry 
of such judgment the judgment creditor shall not thereafter be entitled 
to collect by any form of remedy any greater portion of such arrears than 
that represented by the judgment so entered. I I 
During the early part of 1973, Laura and the child moved to 'Hassachusetts 
as did Sam and his new wife. Laura brought an action in Hassachusetts for 
$2,000.00 in alimony arrearages . 
Discuss all possible defenses and decide the case of Laura v. Sam. 
IV. 5 Points (9 Hinutes) 
Plaintiff, a resident of Florida , sued defendant who is a resident of 
New York in a State court of Florida for damages for negligently causing him 
to be personally injured in a Florida accident. Hhen defendant failed to 
appear or contest the suit, plaintiff 'vas a~varded damages by a jury and 
judgment was entered in Florida for damages and costs. The judgment was not 
paid and plaintiff brought the present suit thereon in Ne,'1 York. Plaintiff 
alleged that after the entry of judgment in Florida the defendant had filed a 
special appearance in the Florida Trial Court challenging the jurisdiction 
of that court over the defendant . Plaintiff asked the court to vacate the 
judgment but the cour t refused finding that service had in fact been made on 
defendant in Florida as certified by the local Sheriff. Defendant appealed 
this decision but the Appellate Court affirmed the refusal to vacate and the 
Supreme Court of Florida denied defendant's petition for a writ of certionari. 
Plaintiff asked for a summary judgment \-lhich ~.,as denied by the Special 
term but granted by the Appellate Division. The case is nm-7 before the Court 
of Appeals. Decide the case. 
V. 10 Points (18 Uinutes) 
On June 10, 1971, Bob purchased a Cadillac from Automobile, Inc. and 
executed a note and chattel mortgage on the car to Automobile to secure the 
IIDpaid balance of the purchase price. On the same day, Automobile assigned 
the note and mortgage to Credi t, Inc. 
The mortgage provided inter alia that Bob would not remove the car from 
New York .. lithout the ,vritten consent of Credit. At all times the parties to 
these transactions resided or did business only in New York. Contrary to the 
provisions of the mortgage, Bob took t h e car to Florida and on September 17, 
1971 the car tvas used to unlawfully transport heroin with the consent of Bob. 
The car \'las seized by Florida authorities pursuant to statute. 
Proceedings were started by Florida for the forfeiture of the car. pursuant 
to § 100 of the Health and Safety Code of Florida which reads as follows: "A 
vehicle used to unlawfully transport or facilitate the unlawful transportation 
of any narcotic, or in which any narcotic is unlawfully possessed by an 
occupant thereof shall be forfeited to the state. II 
An exception to forfeiture is made in favor of a lien claimant under 5101 
of the Health and Safety Code which reads as follows : u the claimant of any 
right, title or interest in the vehicle may prove his lien, mortgage, or 
conditional sales contract to be bona fide and that his right, title, or 
interest was created after a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility , 
character, and reputation of the purchaser, and wi thout any knmdedge that the 
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vehicle was being, or uas to be, used for the purpose charged. 11 Credit admits 
that it made no investigation of Bob because not required to under Neu York lffiv. 
The clear purpose of the forfeiture, as articulated by the Florida 
legislature, lvas to keep cars and of the possession of those v;rho might use them 
for the transportation of narcotics. 
The judgment rendered by the court provided for the sale of the Cadillac 
and the proceeds forfeited to the State of Florida subject to a lien of $2000 
payable to Credit. The State appeals the decision saying the lm-ler court 
erred in recognizin g the lien. The state maintains that the public policy of 
Florida is to enforce its penal statutes and that the civil la\;r of NeH York 
could have no extra-territorial effect to defeat the penal law of Florida. 
Hrite the appellate opinion. 
VI. 15 Poin t s (27 Hinutes) 
Bill and Sue '!.Jere married in :n assachusetts in 1969. Soon after the 
marriage, it became apparent that t h ey Here simply incompatible so they sep-
arated. John remained in Eassachusetts and Sue took up residence in Ne,v York. 
Some months later they met in California vlhile both Here on vacation. 
Realizing t~ at they never finally diso1ved the marriage they decided to get 
divorced in California under a statute "lhich authorized the granting of 
divorces if both the husband and the ,vife are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court. 
The Calif ornia court p roceeded to grant the divorce based on Ne\v York 
lau T,lhich permits incompatibility as a ground for divorce even though both 
Hassachusetts and California permit divorces only on the grounds of adultery. 
Shortly after t he d ivorce , Bill and Sue married Jane and Hichael respect-
ively. 1';0\., the s tate of Ne\" York is ins tituting a b i gamy prosecution against 
Sue. 
In the meantime, Bill 's ne~7 wife, Jane, died and her brother now claims 
that since Bill vIas not properly divorced , he 17as not validly Married to Jane 
and therefore not entitled to share in Jane's estate and that he, the brother, 
is Jane ' s sole heir. 
(1) Decide the case of NeVY York v. Sue 
(2) Decide the case of In Re Jane ' s Estate 
VII. 10 Points (18 Hinutes ) 
Several years ago Ja1'1es and Carol "Tere divorced in Haine vThich vas their 
domicile at the time. The divorce decree purported to finally establish and 
fix James i support obligation to James , Jr., t h e only issue of the marriage. 
FolloYing the divorce Carol and the child moved to Alabama and James moved to 
Texas. 
James Jr . has managed to dissipate the support money due to some extra-
ordinary medicine and educational expenses. In vieu of this, James Jr. 
through a guardian brough t suit for additional support in Texas. James 
answered by setting up the Haine decree as a bar. 
l'lay James Jr. recover for additional support? Explain your ansvTer. 
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VIII. 30 Points (54 !linutes) 
On Jooe 22, 1972, Plaintiff, a resident of Uaryland Has driving on a 
Haryland road about five miles from the District of Columbis line, v]hen a 
speeding automobile, returning to the District, rapidly approached him from 
the rear, collided ~vith the left portion of his car, veered across the road 
and come to res t in a ditch. Plaintiff vias severely injured. 
Upon the arrival of the police, it was discovered that the driver of the 
car causing the accident had abandoned said car. The owner of the abandoned 
car was traced through its District tags to defendant, a resident of the 
District of Columbia. 
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in Haryland based upon a 
statute which provides for personal Jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries of 
Naryland '''-lho commit a tortious act vlithin the state, except as to a cause 
of action for defamation of character arising from the act, or commits a 
tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within 
the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising 
from the act. II Service on the defendant was made as prescribed by statute 
and was proper. 
Defendant maintains that he \las nct the driver of the auto at the time 
of the accident and that, in fact, the auto had been stolen near the \.Jhite 
House prior to the accident. He admits hotvever that a set of keys was 
inadvertantly left in the back seat of the auto, in full view of passers~by. 
Both Naryland and the District have the fol10\17ing statute: 
No person driving, or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to 
stand unattended ~Yithout first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, 
removing the key, and effectively setting the brake thereon and, t7hen 
standing upon any grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or side of 
the hi glnvay • 
Both jurisdictions have articulated the purposes behind their statutes. 
The District maintains that the purpose of the statute is to prevent strangers 
from tampering 1;'lith or stealing cars and injuring others. The statute is 
designed to promote the safety of the public in the streets. Unlocked cars 
create a risk that meddling by children, theives or others will result in 
injuries to the public and the statute discourages this by placing the burden 
of the risk, as far as it may be, upon those who create it. The District also 
cited statistics indicating that 40% of autos stolen in the District are 
involved in accidents. Horeover, 85% of the thieves do not possess an operator's 
permit and that in 42% of the thefts ~ keys yJere left in the cars. 
Haryland maintains that its statute is designed to prevent theft, tampering 
Hith a car, or the starting of a car under its own momentum if the brakes should 
slip. 
Under District law, violation of the statute is negligence ~ ~ v7hereas 
under Haryland law it is not. In fact under District law its courts have stated: 
"Since it is a safety measure, the violation of the statute is negligence. 
This negligence created the hazard and thereby brought about the harm ~\Thich 
the statute was intended to prevent. It was therefore a legal or 
"proximate ll cause of the harm. Both negligence and causation are too 
clear in these circumstances, '-1e think, for submission to a jury.~' 
Haryland courts, on the other hand, have stated that Hthe statute creates 
a duty of safety to the public, but this duty is limited to the immediate 
vicinity of the parking place and a thief , an independant intervening cause, 
is the proximate cause of the accident and not the mroer ~vhose negligence is 
remote. II 
(1) Decide the case of Plaintiff v. Defendant by utilizing a preBabcock 
methodology. 
(2) Hrite a majority and one or more dissenting opinions by utilizing a 
methodology that derives from the Babcock decision. 
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